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Abstract 
In the pursuit of researches and in the reporting of their results, the individual 
scientist as well as the community of fellow professionals rely implicitly on the researcher 
embracing the habit of truthfulness, a main pillar of the ethos of science.  Failure to 
adhere to the twin imperatives of candor and integrity will be adjudged intolerable and, 
by virtue of science’s self-policing mechanisms, rendered the exception to the rule.  Yet 
both as philosophical concepts and in practice, candor and integrity are complex, difficult 
to define clearly, and difficult to convey easily to those entering on scientific careers.  
Therefore it is useful to present operational examples of two major scientists who 
exemplified devotion to candor and integrity in scientific research. 
 
 When scientists communicate with one another, they may be sometimes 
reticent on details, for example, about painfully acquired methods still needed in 
their current research, or about matters that have not yet been settled finally in 
their own minds or laboratories.  But they rarely are not candid in what they 
convey to colleagues or even rivals in their field.  For in scientific research there 
is a mechanism at work that may get one found out rapidly for improbity—a 
mechanism and an ethos much attenuated in most other professions (as the daily 
news tends to make clear, be they concerning politics, the military, industrial 
enterprises, the public media, lawyers, financial gurus, accountancies, even the 
priesthood).  That mechanism is the ability of sufficiently trained, skeptical 
scientists to confirm or deny in principle, and sometimes quite quickly in fact, the 
veracity of a communication offered to them. 
Thus, while scientists are generally born no better or worse with respect to 
the general human tendencies to exaggerate or to deny, to misremember or to 
avoid sharing everything they know quite freely, in the acculturation process 
they learn to suppress those natural instincts, and try to put on what Jacob 
Bronowski named "the habit of truth," which is the key for the successful 
program of science as a whole.  To be sure, when a nuclear scientist is asked 
about the details of a particle accelerator that is still being built, she may not 
always be forthcoming, but at least will reply quite appropriately—perhaps:  
"Sorry, I can't tell you yet"—a negative sort of candor. 
 Candor, of the positive or negative kind, is not the same as integrity; but 
the two notions are related, as indicated in my copy of Roget's Thesaurus, where  
both notions are listed under "probity," together with rectitude, honesty, loyalty, 




interplay between them, in terms of two historical examples of major scientists: 
one from the thoughts and works of P. W. Bridgman, the other from those of 
Niels Bohr, respectively experimenter and theoretician.  They also may serve as 




 Percy W. Bridgman (1882-1961) won the 1946 Nobel Prize in Physics for 
his investigations of the changes in materials subjected to extremely high 
pressures.  He is also widely remembered for his contributions to the philosophy 
of science, which changed the intellectual landscape of many scientists.  His 
philosophy of "operationalism," first elaborated in The Logic of Modern Physics 
(1927), attempted to brush away undefinable elements by proposing that 
concepts should be defined in terms of experimental procedures, or operations—
an approach that influenced economics and psychology also. 
 I had the privilege of knowing Bridgman, first as his dissertation student 
in experimental high-pressure physics, and then as a colleague.  It seems to me 
that his life and work were constructed along about half a dozen ordering ideas. 
Watching him at work, one might have been reminded of Michael Faraday: in 
the simplicity of the experiment and the thoroughness of detail of the research 
accomplished with it.  When I first entered Bridgman's laboratory at Harvard, 
fresh from doing wartime research with advanced pulse circuits, I was 
astounded to see nothing but DC electrical measurements of resistances and 
potentials, and Kelvin Bridges instead of electronics.  Yet the experiments—on 
tiny samples the size of a nail paring, conducted inside small presses that were 
themselves inside bigger presses, and all the information on the changing 
physical properties coming out on one wire to an old galvanometer—were top-
drawer. 
 The work Bridgman did was always personal, hands on, faster and with 
more data points per day than seemed humanly possible.  He said "physics is the 
quantitative exploration and analysis of physical experience."  Those words 
meant what they said: quantitative, exploration, experience.  He was guided not 
by fashionable new theories but by thermodynamics, and the prospect of huge 
areas of new physical phenomena to be conquered.  He gave the impression of 
wanting to harvest field upon field of new data while keeping his eye on yet 
more remarkable ones constantly appearing on the horizon as he increased the 
pressure range.  And one could rely on his every word.  It even went beyond 
that, as I discovered when, after his death, I was asked to archive his laboratory 
notebooks.  And there I found that in the interest of not misleading anyone, he 
had kept himself from publishing the last decimal in each reading, that being the 
region where uncertainties could enter. 
 Like some other scientists I have studied, Bridgman saw no fundamental 
difference between science and philosophy if properly conceived, nor really 
between his life and his work, nor between public and private science.  He made 
no distinction between a novice with interesting ideas and willingness to work 
and take risks and an elder statesman of science on a courtesy visit.  He seemed 
to be curious about every subject in science and outside, but by the same token, 
he was never satisfied that he had really exhausted any deep question.  He 
would not have been surprised to learn that his own extensive work (seven 
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technical books and some 200 scientific papers, plus seven more books and about 
60 papers on philosophy and the study of social science) is useful today in a great 
variety of natural sciences—physics, chemistry, geology, engineering, even in 
biology, as in the study of the properties of protein under high pressure—as well 
as in psychology, economics, philosophy, and history of science. 
 Bridgman loyally stayed with his university from the day he entered as a 
freshman in 1900 until he retired from his professorship 54 years later.  He 
persisted in the same field of research throughout, and saw it grow in power as 
he reluctantly drove the range of attainable pressures in his laboratory from a 
few thousand atmospheres at the start, to ultimately over 400,000.  The same 
persistence came out in the short run as in the long.  A famous example is a 
sentence from one of his scientific papers, describing how to make a thin hole as 
narrow as the lead in a pencil, but in a big block of very hard steel:  "It is easy, if 
all precautions are observed, to drill a hole . . . 17 inches long, in from 7 to 8 
hours." 
 Anyone who knew him can immediately see him, wearing his well-used 
lab coat, at the lathe or at the forepump of the press, pumping up the pressure, 
always by hand, undeflectable by anything while taking data.  I can attest to that.  
On a morning in the fall of 1946, I was in the workshop, constructing apparatus 
for my dissertation problem, which he had agreed to supervise as long as I 
would not bother him too often.  The telephone rang, and I happened to be the 
one to take it.  A voice from the Associated Press asked me to bring Mr. 
Bridgman to the phone.  (Bridgman, of course, did not tolerate a telephone in his 
laboratory.)  I explained it was impossible to get him out while he was taking 
data.  The voice at the other end, now quite agitated, demanded an interview 
with him because the announcement had just come from Stockholm that 
Bridgman had won the Nobel Prize.  Of course I ran into Bridgman's lab to 
convey the great news.  Not missing a single stroke, he continued at the pump 
and said quite simply, "Tell them--I'll believe it--when I see it."  Here indeed was 
the operational approach in action, and also a test of the equanimity of his spirit. 
 Plato said that "clear ideas drive away fantastic ideas," but in Bridgman 
the need to clarify his ideas in honest self-evaluation was not merely therapeutic, 
it was a biological necessity.  He had an ethos of lucidity and candor of the most 
difficult kind: with himself.  In 1938, at the peak of his powers, he wrote, "As I 
grow older, a note of intellectual dissatisfaction becomes an increasingly insistent 
overtone in my life.  I am becoming more and more conscious that my life will 
not stand intellectual scrutiny, and at the same time my desire to lead an 
intelligently well-ordered life grows to an almost physical intensity."   
So for Bridgman, another all-too-frequent barrier was removed—that 
between moral and intellectual issues.  Compelled by his insistence to be clear 
and candid about one's stand, and acting visibly as a citizen-scientist, he 
published a manifesto in Science (Bridgman 1939) in which he announced closing 
his laboratory to visiting scientists of totalitarian countries, because he saw that 
they had subordinated their loyalty to science to the demands authoritarian 
governments might make on their work.  But we also see in the preceding 
quotation a mainspring, a force driving several apparently disparate 
achievements.  His attractions to high-pressure physics seem to have started with 
his attempt to give instrumental meaning to the concept of high hydrostatic 
pressures inside a sealed enclosure.  He never tolerated the use of "black boxes" 
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that required the experimenter to believe a manufacturer's calibration or circuit 
diagram.  His work on dimensional analysis was in the nature of a self-
interrogation.  His book on thermodynamics starts with the question, “What are 
the most basic variables to choose and how do we define them?“ 
 Bridgman may not have read Charles S. Peirce's essay of 1878, "How to 
Make Our Ideas Clear," but he had a deeply rooted affinity with the American 
empiricist philosophers.  Here, too, was the source of his sympathy with the 
philosophy of the displaced Vienna Circle, as brought by refugee scientists and 
philosophers who began to come to the United States in the 1930s.1 
 The Logic of Modern Physics (1927) was his first major contribution to the 
critical analysis of the foundations of physics.  To this day, anyone with scientific 
interest who reads it for the first time finds it an electrifying experience.  As must 
be true for many, I clearly remember the exact place in the library where, as a 
student, I happened upon the book, and then found myself standing there, 
reading the first chapters right away.  Key phrases burn in one's memory:  "In 
general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the 
concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of questions."  Or, "The true 
meaning of a term is to be found by observing what a man does with it, not by 
what he says about it."  Or, "If a specific question has meaning, it must be 
possible to find operations by which answers may be given to it.  It will be found 
in many cases that the operations cannot exist, and the question therefore has no 
meaning."  
All the traits of Bridgman's mind were there:  the lucidity of style, the lack 
of philosophical self-consciousness, the uncompromising drive to the 
foundations.  It was a message of immense power for scientists, at least in the 
English-speaking world, and as in many such cases, the explanation of its power 
is not that the book brings to the reader a message never thought of before, but 
rather that it lays open, with clarity, what the reader has been trying to formulate 
on his or her own.  The most fruitful way of understanding Bridgman's 
philosophical writings is to see them as a record of continual self-interrogation 
and self-discovery.  That is why they have also been such an effective tool of self-
recognition for other scientists. 
 It is not surprising that Bridgman had to clarify for himself philosophical 
problems before he could feel satisfied with his solution of scientific problems.  
For the typical task of science, to put it very simply, is to relate the world of 
appearances, or data, and the world of conceptions, or ideas.  And the usual way 
scientists do this is to construct an arch that starts from the ground of direct 
observation, then rises up to the region of theory, or concepts and other thought 
constructs, and then comes again back to the level of the immediately given, to a 
new set of verifiable observations. 
 The question that always nags the honest mind is this: how can one be 
sure whether or not the arch connecting initial and final data is not merely 
fantasy?  Roughly, Bridgman's answer was that there are two tests.  There must 
be formal connections among the thought elements in the upper region; they 
must be able to stand the tests of logic and of "mental" or "paper-and-pencil" 
operations.  And second, each of the physical concepts used must, in principle, 
be supported from the world of experience below, by having meaning in terms of 
physical or instrumental operations.  This is how the operational attitude 
determines the shape and direction of a possible theory and the type of data 
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relevant to it at each end.  But this process of construction is, of course, not 
restricted only to science.  In Bridgman's straightforward way, he wrote:  "It 
would doubtless conduce greatly to clarity of thought if the operational mode of 
thinking were adopted in all fields of inquiry." Even so, the critique and 
elaboration of his conceptions by other scholars sometimes astonished Bridgman.  
Once, at the end of a long symposium with philosophers, he said, with unusual 
candor: 
As I listened to the papers I felt that I have only a historical 
connection with this thing called 'operationalism' . . . . I  have created a 
Frankenstein, which has certainly got away from me.  I abhor the word 
operationalism...which seems to imply a dogma, or at least a thesis of some 
kind.  This thing I have envisaged is too simple to be dignified by so 
pretentious a name; rather, it is an attitude or point of view generated by 
continued practice of operational analysis . . . . 
 The date usually associated with this is 1927, the year of publication 
of my book, The Logic of Modern Physics, but preparation for this in my 
own thinking went back at least to 1914, when the task of giving two 
advanced courses in electrodynamics was suddenly thrust upon me . . . . 
The underlying conceptional situation in this whole area seemed very 
obscure to me and caused me much intellectual distress, which I tried to 
alleviate as best I could . . . . The dimensional situation proved 
comparatively simple, and I was able to think the situation through to my 
own satisfaction—an experience that perceptibly increased my intellectual 
morale.2 
 
In this quotation there is, I believe, a clue to Bridgman's key motivation.  It 
is the sentence, "I was able to think the situation through to my own satisfaction."  
To clear his own ever-active mind of intellectual disquietude and the possibility of 
self-deception—that was a basic driving force, whether designing an experiment 
or analyzing the foundations of thermodynamics or of society.  He never bothered 
to answer seriously the charge of philosophical solipsism, but I think that the 
answer has to be this:  One cannot, by any other criterion, hope to get maxims that 
are more generally valid than those one can get by letting questions rise up in a 
mind that habitually subjects itself to exceptional intellectual disquietude, and that 
habitually is given to uncompromising, candid self-examination. 
First and last, his science was his individual struggle to discern "the way 
things are," which phrase is, in fact, the title of one of his last books.  Indeed, he 
told me he had preferred to call this book "The Way It Is. " But, he said, "the 
publisher doesn't like it; however, I am still not sure that 'things' really exist."  To 
him, the mark of a scientist was the willingness to devote oneself fully to finding 
out the way it is, regardless of the consequences. 
2. 
As we saw, Bridgman placed the highest value on the most difficult way 
of achieving veracity: trying at all costs to be clear and honest in his own mind—
a paradigmatic case of internal candor.  His direct, plain-spoken, unambiguous 
writings and speeches were a result of that clearing of his own mind.  Turning 
now to Niels Bohr (1885-1962), we find, by contrast, a rather different situation.  
Bohr's writings were usually the result of a painful struggle, sometimes lasting 
for many years of drafting and redrafting, to put into the languages of science 
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and everyday speech his complex thoughts, and yet many of these publications 
and public addresses were, as he knew, difficult to unpuzzle.  I had the 
opportunity to discuss this problem with him.  He explained it to me in a moving 
sentence:  "I do not chose to speak or write more clearly than I think."  In this 
case, candor consisted in conveying with honesty the insufficiency of ordinary 
language to represent fully the internal state of a superb mind.  However, as if to 
make up for this difficulty, Bohr became the paradigmatic example of the twin-
brother of candor—namely, integrity. 
Again, first a brief overview of his scientific career.  It is commonly agreed 
that it may be divided roughly into five periods.  During the first decade of his 
professional life, his main concern was with spectra, the absorption and emission 
of light, the structure of the periodic table, and the chemical properties of matter.  
During the second period, from the early 1920s for about a decade, he was the 
leader of his Institute for Theoretical Physics in Copenhagen, devoting himself to 
the conquest of quantum mechanics, working with furious energy, and 
surrounded by a remarkable group of young scientists from all over the world.  
This was the time of concern with the wave-particle puzzle, the uncertainty 
relation, complementarity, the discovery of the loss of visualizable physics, and the 
clarification of problems ranging from the structure of crystals to the chemical 
bond. By the late 1920s, it seemed that in principle all properties of atoms and 
molecules were understandable by the single force of electromagnetism. 
In the third period, from the early 1930s until the occupation of Denmark 
by the Germans in April 1940, Bohr and his collaborators worked on what came to 
be known as field quantization, elementary particle physics, and the structure of 
the atomic nucleus.  After Bohr's narrow escape from Denmark to Sweden in 1943, 
followed by his trip to England and then to the United States, his career entered a 
fourth phase as he consulted with the British scientists, and later with those at Los 
Alamos, who had entered upon the huge effort to preempt the German attempt to 
make a nuclear weapon—an attempt on which the Germans, as recent 
documentation shows, had in fact embarked first. But at the same time Bohr also 
became more and more concerned with planning for the postwar world, including 
his tragically unsuccessful efforts to open the eyes of Roosevelt, Churchill, and 
later of the United Nations leadership to opportunities that might well have 
averted the nuclear arms race. 
In his last twenty years, Bohr was chiefly occupied with applying the 
lessons of his science not only to further research in physics but to all spheres of 
life, ranging from philosophy to international politics.  He also devoted himself to 
the internationalization of scientific cooperation, as in the founding of CERN, the 
European center for research in high-energy physics, and to encouraging scientists 
in third-world countries. 
Studying Bohr's work and life, I see four principles of integrity in science 
that possessed him to the end, four principles that can be emulated in our time. 
The first of these is simply this: Try to get it right at all costs, sparing no effort. 
You may have to seek help and advice where possible; but do all you can to 
prove to yourself and others that your scientific idea is correct. This norm or 
principle of integrity of science in the narrowest interpretation of the phrase can 
nevertheless be very hard, and may even drive one to the edge of despair if one 
has selected a really worthy problem. I have been surprised how often the word 
“despair” comes up in the autobiographies and letters of some of our best 
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scientists. Heisenberg once recalled his collaboration with Bohr in 1926 and 1927, 
saying “We couldn't doubt that this [quantum mechanics] was the correct 
scheme, but even then we didn't know how to talk about it. [These discussions] 
threw us into a state of almost complete despair”(Heisenberg 1975, 569).3 
Obedience to this norm can force one to take risks on behalf of a hard-won 
scientific idea before it is fashionable or safe. Again, Bohr’s life and work contain 
many powerful illustrations. On arriving in Manchester, he soon saw that Ernest 
Rutherford’s idea of a nuclear atom was right, and moreover that the atom 
“seemed to be regulated from inner part to the outer by the quantum.”4 This 
recognition immediately became the basis of Bohr’s first great work. But think 
what it entailed at the time. Although Rutherford himself was at the first Solvay 
Congress in 1911, nobody mentioned his discovery of the nucleus during that 
summit meeting of the major physicists of the day. It took a few more years, 
including Bohr’s and Henry Moseley’s work, for scientists to catch on generally. 
But Bohr had staked everything on it at once, and on the quantum ideas of 
Planck and Einstein that also were only beginning to be accepted by physicists. 
The result was the “Bohr atom” in Bohr’s paper of 1913. It has long ago made its 
way into all the schoolbooks, but the reception at the time was quite different. 
Otto Stern is reported to have remarked, “If this nonsense is correct, I will give 
up being a physicist.” Bohr said later, “There was even a general consent that it 
was a very sad thing that the literature about spectra should be contaminated by 
a paper of that kind.”5 The risk young Bohr took in his 1913 paper could well 
have endangered his career. It was a physics so very different from that of 
Newton, Maxwell, Planck, Thomson, and even Rutherford. 
It is a part of the first principle of integrity that one must submit oneself to 
the dialogue with others to find out whether one is right. New science starts in 
the head of an individual, but it does not survive unless it becomes part of the 
consensus of the community. Bohr knew this well. When his mentor Rutherford 
received Bohr’s paper in manuscript, he agreed to sent it on to be published 
despite his objections, but he wrote to Bohr, “I suppose you have no objection to 
my using my judgment to cut out any matter I may consider unnecessary in your 
paper?” (Moore 1985, 50).  
Poor Rutherford! A considerably extended version of the earlier 
manuscript was already on its way to him, and soon thereafter Bohr himself 
appeared at his door, having come from Denmark where he had gone to 
establish himself. For many long evenings they discussed every point. Bohr 
reported that at the end, Rutherford declared he had not realized Bohr would 
prove so obstinate, but “he consented to leave all the old and new points in the 
final paper”(French and Kennedy 1985, 79). Then Bohr went to Göttingen and 
Munich, and succeeded in bringing some of the older, skeptical physicists 
around. 
That Einstein never gave in to the Copenhagen view on quantum 
mechanics was to Bohr a source of real unhappiness. Indeed, very few others 
escaped Bohr’s almost missionary zeal. His collaborators such as Leon Rosenfeld 
were overawed by Bohr’s unrelenting effort to attain clarity of fundamentals. 
Bohr’s favorite quotation was from Schiller: “Only fullness leads to clarity / And 
truth lies in the abyss.” To gain the real treasures one must be ready to descend 
into the abyss, that dangerous place at the bottom where two huge slopes 
(representing contrary theories) push against each other.   
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3. 
I have already begun to move into the second of the principles of integrity 
in science. It concerns the difference between choosing the narrowly specialized 
problems—relatively safe but at the cost of a fragmenting and disintegrating 
tendency for the subject—versus choosing the more difficult problem that has 
some promise to bring coherence to the field, and with it integrity in the second 
sense of that word. To put it succinctly, the second principle might run as 
follows: Try to be a scientist first, a specialist second. If you have it in you to 
make more than individual bricks that others might use, throw your life’s 
energies into work on what Einstein called the great temple of science. 
Again, Niels Bohr can give us all the examples we need, even in his 1913 
paper, where he introduced the correspondence principle in its early form 
precisely in order to connect quantum physics with classical physics in the limit 
of large orbits. It is a powerful bridge that Bohr used to great advantage for 
years, for example for the theory of stopping fast-moving particles in matter, in 
his 1948 survey. Similarly he dealt with the puzzle of light and matter for over 
two decades, trying ways to reconcile the discontinuity shown by quantum 
effects with the continuity shown in classical physics.  
Dealing with science in a coherent way also led him to think about 
scientific fields far beyond physics, in a manner that few had dared to do since 
the days of Helmholtz and Ernst Mach. He struggled constantly with what he 
called “the epistemological lesson which the modern development of atomic 
physics has given us, and its relevance for [the other] fields of human 
knowledge”(Bohr 1961, v).  One chief lesson of quantum mechanics was that 
atomic processes did not have to be described in fragmentary ways, with 
different theories for different effects, but that through quantum mechanics we 
could see the wholeness of the processes in and among atoms. 
   Could this lesson not be applied to wider fields? Bohr thought it could. 
Therefore his essays dealt often with “biological and anthropological problems,” 
stressing the features of wholeness distinguishing living organisms and human 
cultures—at least insofar as such “problems present themselves against the 
background of the general lesson of atomic physics”(Bohr 1961, 2). 
To some extent, Bohr’s pursuit of the second principle was part of the old 
hope of the “unity of all sciences,” a phrase he often used. But it is not merely a 
phrase, an empty dream. That the various branches of science form one organic, 
interlocking picture of the world shows up in almost any substantial scientific 
research today. A modern paper on cosmology is really a jigsaw puzzle of which 
the pieces might well carry individually such labels as “elementary particle 
physics,” “general relativity,” “applied mathematics,” and “observational 
astronomy.” An experiment in neurophysiology brings together physics, 
chemistry, biology, computer technology, mathematics, and engineering, all at 
once. Such examples are becoming the rule. As Bronowski wrote, “Science is not 
a set of facts, but a way of giving order and therefore giving unity and 
intelligibility to the facts of nature”(Bronowski 1956). 
If Bohr himself did not work directly in fields outside the physical 
sciences, he did persuade some of his younger collaborators. A major example is 
Max Delbrück, who gladly confessed that the prime motivation of his own early 
work in biology was “Niels Bohr’s suggestion of the complementarity principle 
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in biology as a counterpart to the complementarity principle in physics”(Kay 
1985). 
4. 
As we come to the third principle of integrity in science, as exemplified in 
Bohr's life and work, the area of action, opportunity, and obligation for the 
responsible scientist widens still further, and so does the challenge to follow 
Bohr’s example. Both the findings of modern science and its “habit of truth to 
experience” have penetrated deeply into the world of culture as a whole. The 
third principle of integrity in science might go like this: “Science is, and should 
be, part of the total world view of our time. This is a vision you should 
imaginatively explore, defend, and contribute to.” 
There are various ways of implementing such a vision, and Niels Bohr 
was active in each of them. There is of course the task of pedagogy, the need to 
bring scientific understanding to all parts of society, not least because persons in 
this modern world who do not know the basic facts that determine their very 
existence, functioning, and surroundings are in fact living in a dream world. 
Such persons are, in a sense, not sane. 
Then there is the link of science and policy. If that link is not understood, 
if the technical implications for good and ill are not made clear, democracy is at 
risk because the leadership can be caught up in fantasies—whether technocratic 
or Luddite—and the citizenry cannot participate in the basic decisions that have 
technical components. 
But for Bohr, the third principle asserted itself also in an almost 
compulsive pursuit, during the last twenty years of his life, to find bridges 
between scientific knowledge and such nonscientific fields as ethics, the arts, and 
philosophy.  Bohr was interested in philosophy from early youth on, looking for 
“great interrelationships” among all areas of knowledge.6  This ambition 
eventually took a different and grander form, based chiefly on the 
complementarity principle he announced in 1927. There are various statements 
of it. Bohr's own briefest formulation goes like this: “Any given application of 
classical concepts precludes the simultaneous use of other classical concepts 
which, in a different connection, are equally necessary for the elucidation of the 
phenomena.”7  The issue behind all this, as Robert Oppenheimer and many 
othershave stressed, concerns the three great overlapping questions:  What is 
objectivity? What is reality? Is the world deterministic or not? For classical 
physics, it was possible to say that the world was deterministic in the sense that 
if the positions and momenta of all objects were precisely measured, the future 
course of all history would be known. But, Bohr asked, would this be true on the 
atomic scale? Could that world be known more and more certainly, independent 
of our own predilections, or decisions, or our laboratory arrangements? 
As we know, Bohr, Heisenberg, and others of that circle gave a 
resounding “No” to that question in the 1920s. Objective knowledge of a 
phenomenon, in Bohr’s terms, is what you learn from the full reports of all 
experimental arrangements that probe into the phenomenon—arrangements, be 
it noted, of apparatus on the scale of everyday life, and describable in ordinary 
human language (with mathematics merely a compact and refined extension of 
it). There is no firm boundary between that which is observed and the observing 
machinery; the boundary is movable, and the different descriptions that result 
from different placements of the boundary are complementary. Together they 
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give an exhaustive account of whatever one means by reality. Objectivity, 
according to the Copenhagen school, is therefore, in Oppenheimer’s phrase, not 
an “ontological attribute”—that is, not a description of the property of being—
but becomes a problem of communication. 
Bohr saw in his complementarity principle the hope to extend the concept 
of complementarity beyond physics, in dealing with such opposing concepts or 
mutually exclusive experiences as thought and introspection, justice and charity, 
the processes in the living cell and the biophysical, biochemical analysis of 
organisms. By describing his ambitious attempt for examination, I am of course 
not proposing that Niels Bohr’s own solution to meet the obligation of the third 
principle of integrity be universally adopted. Rather, I am illustrating the 
challenge that genius sets for itself. We scientists, in our more humble ways, 
should also do what we can to explore the links between the sciences and with 
other areas of scholarship, or we shall be pushed out of the common culture. The 
laboratory remains our workplace, but it must not become our hiding place. 
The full grandeur of Bohr’s ambition was to apply the complementarity 
point of view also to the understanding and toleration of differences between 
traditional cultural systems. What gave it all such urgency for him was his 
perception that the most time-honored method of conflict between societies was 
chiefly the attempt by one to annihilate the other, and that in the atomic age.  
This method had become a guarantee for universal catastrophe, for mutual 
suicide. As Bohr put it, the main obstacle to a peaceful relation between various 
human societies is “the deep-rooted differences of the traditional 
backgrounds...which exclude any simple comparison [or accommodation] 
between such cultures. It is above all in this connection that the viewpoint of 
complementarity offers itself as a means of coping with the situation”(Bohr 1961, 
30). 
He never gave up the hope that this could be achieved, although he knew 
it would not be done soon.  In his last interview, on the day before his death, he 
said, “There is no philosopher who really understands what one means by the 
complementarity description. It has to go [into] the schools.” The Copernican 
system was, for a long time, also not accepted by the philosophers. But 
eventually “the school children didn’t think it was so bad. [This is how it got 
into] common knowledge. I think it will be exactly the same with the 
complementarity description.”8 
5. 
With this I have come to the fourth, the last and most demanding of the 
principles of integrity: the special obligation scientists have to exercise sound 
citizenship. There are many reasons why that obligation is special, and the very 
opposite of elitist arrogance. The most obvious one is simply this: having been 
helped to become scientists and to live as scientists in this suffering world, we 
are the beneficiaries of unusual privilege, of scarce resources, and of the painful 
labors of our scientific parents. The mechanics we learned in school came to birth 
in the anguish of Galileo, dictating his book in his old age, disgraced, blind, and 
under house arrest. Kepler died on a highway like a dog, on one of his futile 
journeys to find money to pay for printing the books from which we have 
learned about his laws. Indeed, many of the formulas we rely on every day were 
distilled from the blood and sweat of our distant forebears, most of them now 
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forgotten. We stand not only on the shoulders of a few, but also at the graves of 
thousands. 
Science by its nature is cumulative and consensual, a social activity across 
space and time. In addition, any new scientific finding has the potential of 
changing, sooner or later, some part of the life of mankind, and not in every case 
for the better. Under these circumstances one must conclude that science has a 
just claim to moral authority when it is widely seen as an activity that honors 
both truth and the public interest. By this I do not mean that each individual 
scientist must be active beyond science on behalf of the welfare of society, as 
were Bohr and Bridgman in their different ways. But I do mean that when we 
look over the profession as a whole we must be able to say that this group, 
through the activities of enough of its members, is responding to its special 
responsibilities--special for all the reasons I have given, but also because on 
certain issues our scientific knowledge does give us an opportunity to make 
essential policy suggestions.9  And special too, some may wish to add, simply 
because the flow of so much good brain power into science and technology today 
may have caused a corresponding deficit or opportunity cost in the rest of the 
polity. 
Here again, Niels Bohr is an exemplar of the good citizen within the 
republic of science. This came through in so many ways, earliest perhaps by his 
openness to and encouragement of new talent, no matter from where it came. But 
from the many illustrations we must finally select the example he gave us 
through his dedication to oppose the arms race. 
More than most others, Bohr thought of the atomic bomb not only as 
decisive in countering any such German effort: as his memoranda to President 
Roosevelt and later his letter to the United Nations show, Bohr also thought of 
such weapons as ending at last the tolerability of war itself. Thus he wrote, “The 
expectations for a future harmonious international cooperation...remarkably 
correspond to the unique opportunities which...have been created by the 
advancement of science”(Bohr 1985).  For this to happen, as he saw very clearly, 
one had to preempt a nuclear arms race after World War II. To achieve that, in 
turn, meant capturing the energies of the world’s scientists, as well as of the atom 
itself, for peaceful purposes. And that inevitably meant we would need an “open 
world,” for the verification of arms control agreements, for sharing technical 
information for peaceful uses, and also for sharing more in one another’s 
cultures. 
The main stumbling block, he knew well, would be dealing properly with 
the Soviet Union. Often invaded, and again deeply ravaged by war, its citizens 
viewed themselves as a great nation, beleaguered but not to be coerced. To avoid 
a fatal increase in hostility and suspicion on their part, Bohr argued again and 
again in 1944 and early 1945 that one would have to bring them in before the end 
of the war, while they were still allies, to reach an understanding of the world’s 
common interests, including the industrial uses of atomic energy, based on 
concessions on each side. 
Bohr saw a unique opportunity before the full development and 
deployment of a new weapons system, an opportunity in which historically 
based rivalries and contrary traditions could be submerged and their negative 
potential defused. He urged also that scientists of different countries, used to 
international collaboration and having bonds across national frontiers, could 
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prove especially helpful with the deliberations of their respective governments. 
Finally, he hoped that the world’s political leadership would contain sufficiently 
many statesmen to whom scientists could speak on such matters and who would 
understand them. 
We know of course how very differently it all came out. In early 1944 
Churchill and, at his urging, Roosevelt agreed that the Soviet leadership be faced 
with a fait accompli of the atomic bomb’s development. Thereby they were betting 
that secrecy was really working, and that any Soviet buildup of a similar system 
later on would be slow. Neither turned out to be true. Incidentally, they also 
agreed that Bohr should be carefully watched because of his eager interest in 
international collaboration on arms control. If it had been up to Churchill alone, 
Bohr would probably have been interned after Bohr visited Churchill in an 
attempt to convert him to Bohr's view. 
Scholars will debate for years whether a break through the fears on both 
sides, and particularly through the alienation of Stalin and his circle (about 
whom Bohr had no illusions), could have resulted from the vision of a 
harmonious and progressive world which Bohr urged. With his usual eloquence, 
Robert Oppenheimer summed up the hopeful view in these words: “I think that 
if we had acted wisely and clearly and discreetly, in accordance with Bohr’s 
views, we might have been freed of our rather sleazy sense of omnipotence, and 
our delusions about the effectiveness of secrecy, and turned our society toward a 
healthier vision of a future worth living for”(Oppenheimer). Even as yet other 
potentially destabilizing weapon systems are being designed, these words 
should remind us how fatefully the world today is facing a moment of history 
that has close analogies to the situation then. And once more, as Niels Bohr and 
others have shown at similar points, the moral authority of scientists as citizens 
will be tested by the seriousness, courage, and eloquence with which they inform 
the current debate. 
With candor and integrity in mind, when our students and colleagues 
inquire about probity in science, let us tell them of Bridgman and Bohr. Let us 
tell them that such probity is not achieved merely through fear of sanctions 
against dishonor, but must be earned through positive acts: acts motivated by 
thorough intellectual self-examination and the adoption of the merciless habit of 
truth; motivated by some understanding of the grand history of our science, and 
of our privileged place in it; motivated by the scope and seriousness of the quest 
as scientists; motivated by the hope that science will help build a coherent world 
picture; and not least motivated by our responsibilities, as citizen-scientists, to 
the larger society that has nourished us, the society which we must help to 
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